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Incognito Mode Is in the Constitution 
Travis Panneck 
“Visibility is a trap.”1 
  INTRODUCTION   
The Dread Pirate Roberts was apprehended not on the high 
seas but in the stacks of the San Francisco Public Library.2 
“Dread Pirate Roberts”3 (DPR) was the name adopted by an in-
ternet user who had created and maintained the Silk Road, an 
online black market where users could buy and sell illicit drugs, 
medical supplies, and even Thai energy drinks.4 After a lengthy 
investigation5 involving fake identities, a staged torture, and a 
trip to Iceland,6 the FBI believed that they had identified the 
man behind the moniker: Ross William Ulbricht. 
 
  J.D. Candidate, 2020, University of Minnesota Law School. Thanks to 
Professor Kevin Reitz and the editors and staffers of the Minnesota Law Review 
for comments, suggestions, and diligent editorial work. All remaining mistakes 
are my own. Copyright © 2019 by Travis Panneck.  
 1. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE & PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 
200 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977). 
 2. Natasha Bertrand, The FBI Staged a Lovers’ Fight To Catch the King-
pin of the Web’s Biggest Illegal Drug Marketplace, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 22, 2015), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/the-arrest-of-silk-road-mastermind-ross 
-ulbricht-2015-1 [https://perma.cc/G6A6-CWC4].  
 3. The name derives from the fictional character from The Princess Bride 
who turns out to be not one man, but several who pass the identity to successors 
to maintain a fearsome reputation. See THE PRINCESS BRIDE (20th Century Fox 
1987) (“I am not the Dread Pirate Roberts . . . . My name is Ryan; I inherited 
the ship from the previous Dread Pirate Roberts, just as you will inherit it from 
me. The man I inherited it from is not the real Dread Pirate Roberts either.”). 
 4. See 15 Things You Could Have Purchased on Silk Road, COMPLEX (Oct. 
3, 2013), https://www.complex.com/pop-culture/2013/10/silk-road/ 
[https://perma.cc/9DG9-DHTJ]. 
 5. For a narrative account of this investigation and the capture of Ul-
bricht, see generally NICK BILTON, AMERICAN KINGPIN: THE EPIC HUNT FOR 
THE CRIMINAL MASTERMIND BEHIND THE SILK ROAD (2017). 
 6. Joshuah Bearman, The Rise & Fall of Silk Road, Part 2: The Fall, 
  
512 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [104:511 
 
 Leading up to Ulbricht’s arrest, the government tried to as-
sociate Ulbricht with the DPR moniker and the Silk Road by 
warrantlessly collecting information about his internet use.7 Us-
ing “pen registers” and “trap and trace” devices to monitor Ul-
bricht’s home router, the government obtained detailed infor-
mation about Ulbricht’s internet activity, including dates and 
times of use, duration of use, and other connection data.8 With-
out ever having to show probable cause, the government peered 
into Ulbricht’s daily internet use and built its case against him.9 
On the basis of this comprehensive and intrusive internet sur-
veillance, the government obtained a warrant for Ulbricht’s ar-
rest.10 Law enforcement seized Ulbricht and his laptop at the 
public library while he allegedly was working on the Silk Road.11 
Ulbricht was tried, convicted, and sentenced to two life sen-
tences.12 His conviction was affirmed on appeal.13 
It is not merely masterminds of online marketplaces for 
drugs that should be worried about surveillance of internet 
use.14 Online companies currently hold massive amounts of in-
formation about their users that is comprehensive and accu-
rate;15 rarely do people attempt to deceive their own computer 
 
WIRED (June 2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/05/silk-road-2/ [https://perma 
.cc/945R-PEHX]. 
 7. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Ulbricht v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 
2708 (2018) (No. 17-950), 2017 WL 6812114, at *5. 
 8. Id. at 5–6, 2017 WL 6812114, at *5–6. 
 9. Id. at 5–6, 2017 WL 6812114, at *5–6.  
 10. Id. at 6–7, 2017 WL 6812114, at *6–7. 
 11. See Bertrand, supra note 2. 
 12. See Katherine Mangu-Ward, Ross Ulbricht Is Serving a Double Life 
Sentence, REASON (July 2018), https://reason.com/2018/05/31/ross-ulbricht-is 
-serving-a-dou [https://perma.cc/84F2-K8QZ]. The minimum sentence was ten 
years. Id. 
 13. United States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71, 90 (2d Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 
138 S. Ct. 2708 (2018). 
 14. Consider, for example, six anonymous commenters that dared to ex-
press displeasure with Judge Katherine Forrest’s decision in Ulbricht’s case. 
The blog on which those comments appeared was served with a grand jury sub-
poena for “any and all identifying information” about those commenters. See 
Nick Gillespie & Matt Welch, How Government Stifled Reason’s Free Speech, 
REASON (June 19, 2015, 5:08 PM), https://reason.com/2015/06/19/government 
-stifles-speech/ [https://perma.cc/4ZUF-NLCF]. 
 15. See, e.g., Dylan Curran, Are You Ready? Here Is All the Data Facebook 
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about what they are looking for or communicating about online. 
As Bruce Schneier put it: “No one ever lies to a search engine.”16  
Though many are aware of the massive records held by com-
panies like Facebook and Google, Professor Paul Ohm has ar-
gued that the information held by internet service providers 
alone could be used to “compile a detailed record of thoughts and 
behavior,” getting lists of what you “read, watch, buy, and bor-
row.”17 The potential for harm arising from access to this infor-
mation, Ohm says, is “limited only by the wickedness of one’s 
imagination.”18 While current United States law requires a war-
rant when the government seeks the “contents” of internet com-
munications,19 this may not in practice limit the government 
from discovering the content via other forms of internet history 
that are less protected under the law.20 The Supreme Court’s 
revolutionary decision in Carpenter v. United States21 presents a 
new way forward that safeguards legitimate privacy interests in 
internet activity while still allowing law enforcement to police 
the internet’s worst members.  
This Note will argue that Carpenter heralds a new approach 
to Fourth Amendment searches that courts can and should apply 
to law enforcement’s collection of non-content internet history 
and basic subscriber information. Part I will explain the tradi-
tional approach to applying the Fourth Amendment to law en-
forcement acquisition of internet history. Then, Part I will lay 
out the decision in Carpenter and how the Court’s approach to 
the Fourth Amendment appears to have shifted. Part II will 
show that lower courts do not presently appear to be responding 
 
 16. Liz Mineo, On Internet Privacy, Be Very Afraid, HARV. GAZETTE (Aug. 
24, 2017), https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2017/08/when-it-comes-to 
-internet-privacy-be-very-afraid-analyst-suggests/  
[https://perma.cc/5HZX-C9A9]. 
 17. Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 1417, 1445 (2009). 
 18. Id. at 1444.  
 19. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b) (2012). For a discussion of how law enforcement 
collects various forms of internet history, see infra Part I.C. 
 20. See Saul Hansell, One Subpoena Is All It Takes To Reveal Your Online 
Life, N.Y. TIMES: BITS (July 7, 2008), https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/07/07/ 
the-privacy-risk-from-the-courts/ [https://perma.cc/KBH9-Q5RZ] (“[W]ith a sub-
poena, the Internet provider can be forced to identify which of their customers 
was assigned a particular I.P. address at a particular time. That is how the 
recording industry has been identifying and suing people who use file sharing 
programs.”). 
 21. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
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to this shift, restricting the reasoning in Carpenter to the narrow 
set of facts before the Court in that case. Part II will also demon-
strate that the current limitations on the collection of internet 
history are insufficient and illustrate how a failure to accord 
greater protections threatens privacy. Finally, Part III will posit 
that courts can and should extend Carpenter’s reasoning to cover 
non-content internet history and subscriber information. Part 
III will further suggest that courts should ultimately require 
that law enforcement seeking to collect these data obtain a war-
rant founded on probable cause. 
I.  THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE LAW 
SURROUNDING COLLECTION OF INTERNET HISTORY   
The use of the internet produces massive amounts of infor-
mation,22 much of which may be of interest to law enforcement 
seeking to root out crime. Law enforcement must, however, abide 
by the Fourth Amendment, which protects against “unreasona-
ble searches and seizures.”23 “Searches” is a term of limitation, 
meaning that the Fourth Amendment does not reach conduct 
that is not a “search.”24 Where a Fourth Amendment “search” 
does not occur, there is no constitutional requirement that police 
conduct be reasonable. While Congress is free to set up addi-
tional protections for citizens against actions of law enforce-
ment,25 the Constitution does not hamstring law enforcement 
conduct that is not a search. 
This Part will describe how the government can currently 
collect information about a criminal suspect’s internet history 
and a recent development in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
that may require changes in these established methods. First, 
Section A will describe the different types of history a user gen-
erates when they use the internet. Next, Section B will provide 
the constitutional backdrop for government collection of internet 
history, including a description of the law of searches and an im-
portant exception, the third-party doctrine. Section C will then 
describe how this law is applied in practice, showing the appli-
cation of the third-party doctrine to internet history and sub-
scriber information. Finally, Section D will describe Carpenter v. 
 
 22. See Josh James, Data Never Sleeps 6.0, DOMO (June 5, 2018), https:// 
www.domo.com/blog/data-never-sleeps-6/ [https://perma.cc/C9M2-DMTR]. 
 23. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 24. See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amend-
ment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 356 (1974). 
 25. Limited of course by their constitutional ambit. 
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United States, a recent Supreme Court decision that may upend 
how the government collects a criminal suspect’s internet his-
tory. 
A. THE CREATION AND STORAGE OF INTERNET HISTORY 
When someone uses the internet, a great deal of history 
about their session is created and stored. The internet is a set of 
protocols that allows computers to communicate with each 
other.26 For example, if DPR wants to access a webpage on the 
internet, DPR’s computer needs to know where the webpage is 
and what the webpage contains.  
To identify where a webpage lives on the internet, comput-
ers must be able to find each other. To accomplish this, each com-
puter connected to the internet is given an Internet Protocol (IP) 
address. IP addresses “are the unique numbers assigned to every 
computer or device that is connected to the Internet.”27 Users 
typically obtain IP addresses through internet service providers 
(ISPs).28 Buying an internet connection generally entails com-
municating basic subscriber information to an ISP, which may 
include the user’s real name, address, email addresses, and 
credit card or bank numbers. ISPs obtain allocations of IP ad-
dresses from registries, which they then assign to users that buy 
connections to the internet from them.29 Usually, these IP ad-
dresses are dynamic—the home user’s IP address can change 
 
 26. See generally Aaron Titus, How the Internet Works in 5 Minutes, 
YOUTUBE (Feb. 18, 2009), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7_LPdttKXPc (ex-
plaining the basic structure of the internet). 
 27. ICANN, BEGINNER’S GUIDE TO INTERNET PROTOCOL (IP) ADDRESSES 2 
(2011), https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/ip-addresses-beginners 
-guide-04mar11-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/C9UQ-LDRM]. The use of “unique” 
here may not be entirely accurate. As noted later in this paragraph, IP ad-
dresses can change upon connection to the internet. Because there are a limited 
number of IP addresses, this can lead to situations where an internet service 
provider (ISP) may allocate an IP address to a user that has already been as-
signed before or is currently in use by another user. This Note is concerned with 
the situation where an IP address has provided reliable information about a 
user. But it is important to realize that the use of IP addresses as an investiga-
tive tool at all is itself fraught. See AARON MACKEY ET AL., ELECTRONIC FRON-
TIER FOUND., UNRELIABLE INFORMANTS: IP ADDRESSES, DIGITAL TIPS AND PO-
LICE RAIDS (2016), https://www.eff.org/files/2016/09/22/2016.09.20_final_ 
formatted_ip_address_white_paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/57TM-ABWH]. 
 28. See Number Resources, INTERNET ASSIGNED NUMBERS AUTHORITY, 
https://www.iana.org/numbers [https://perma.cc/NV99-VUWC]. 
 29. See id. 
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each time they connect to the internet.30 Registries keep track of 
which IPs they issue to which ISPs, such that if a person knows 
an IP address, they can determine which ISP issued that ad-
dress.31 Information about which ISP issued which IP address is 
publicly available.32 
IP addresses are 32-bit numbers expressed as a “dotted dec-
imal number,” like so: 162.241.16.20.33 Perhaps because people 
have trouble remembering long strings of numbers,34 computers 
(most often servers providing websites) can be given “domain 
names.”35 Domain name servers (DNS) may then be used to as-
sociate a domain name with an IP address.36 For example, que-
rying a DNS would tell a user that minnesotalawreview.org is, 
as of this writing,37 located at 162.241.16.20. 
But an IP address and domain name can only tell a user on 
which website a webpage lives, not what is on the webpage. A 
more specific address, called a uniform resource locator (URL), 
is used to direct a computer to a specific piece of content on the 
internet, such as a particular webpage.38 URLs are displayed in 
 
 30. See Jeff Tyson, How Internet Infrastructure Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS 
(Apr. 3, 2001), https://computer.howstuffworks.com/internet/basics/internet 
-infrastructure9.htm [https://perma.cc/KR7P-S8BX]. Some users that seek to 
run servers will obtain a “static” IP address that does not change. Id.  
 31. See AM. REGISTRY FOR INTERNET NUMBERS, https://www.arin.net 
[https://perma.cc/EX89-Z7SH]. 
 32. See id. 
 33. ICANN, supra note 27, at 5. Note that not all IP addresses take this 
form. See id. IPv4 addresses look like this, but ISPs and other network operators 
are switching to IPv6 because IPv4 can only support just over four billion de-
vices. Id. IPv6 addresses are 128-bit numbers that take the form 
2001:0db8:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0053. Id. IPv6 supports more devices, 
having a capacity of 340 undecillion addresses. Id. 
 34. See, e.g., Lauren Schenkman, In the Brain, Seven Is a Magic Number, 
ABCNEWS (Dec. 6, 2009), https://abcnews.go.com/Technology/brain-memory 
-magic-number/story?id=9189664 [https://perma.cc/H8J8-PHRL] (“[O]n aver-
age, the longest sequence a normal person can recall on the fly contains about 
seven items.”). 
 35. See Web Terms 101: The Difference Between a URL, Domain, Website, 
and More., GOOGLE DOMAINS, https://domains.google/learning-center/web 
-terms-101/ [https://perma.cc/EP5T-8WR4].  
 36. See DNS and WHOIS – How It Works, ICANN WHOIS, https://whois 
.icann.org/en/dns-and-whois-how-it-works [https://perma.cc/3QV8-ZNXT] (last 
updated July 2017). 
 37. Website accessed on October 14, 2019. 
 38. See Tim Berners-Lee, Universal Resource Identifiers in WWW, WORLD 
WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM, https://www.w3.org/Addressing/URL/uri-spec.html 
[https://perma.cc/9XSD-V9YP].  
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the “address bar” of most web browsers and may look like this: 
https://www.minnesotalawreview.org/2017/11/21/carpenter-iph-
one-fourth-amendment/. URLs will usually include the domain 
name (minnesotalawreview.org) and additional text directing 
the computer to serve a specific piece of content (/2017/11/21/car-
penter-iphone-fourth-amendment/). Once a computer requests 
content from a URL, that content is divided into packets, which 
are then reassembled to deliver the content on the destination 
computer.39 
This internet traffic is directed through ports.40 A port “is a 
type of electronic, software- or programming-related docking 
point through which information flows from a program on your 
computer or to your computer from the Internet or another com-
puter in a network.”41 Some types of internet traffic, like email 
and hypertext (what most webpages use), receive specific port 
numbers to identify and direct the internet traffic, such that the 
information is only available through that port.42 These reserved 
ports might be thought of as filters that only allow one type of 
content through. To continue the example from above, web 
browsers accessing the Minnesota Law Review webpage will 
“ask” to receive information through port 80, the port number 
reserved for hypertext transfer (represented as 
162.241.16.20:80). If a request is made on port 80 to see the Law 
Review’s webpage, it will succeed. Trying to access the page 
through a port reserved for some other type of content, like port 
17 (represented as 162.241.16.20:17), which is reserved for serv-
ers providing quotes of the day, would fail: the computer hosting 
the webpage would reject the request. 
ISPs can see (and therefore collect) most of this infor-
mation.43 Despite efforts to encrypt connections to reduce visibil-
ity of this information, ISPs can see domain names and may also 
 
 39. See What Is a Packet?, HOWSTUFFWORKS (Dec. 1, 2000), https:// 
computer.howstuffworks.com/question525.htm [https://perma.cc/398L-VQNM].  
 40. See What Is a Port?, WHATISMYIPADDRESS.COM, 
https://whatismyipaddress.com/port [https://perma.cc/G7KD-WCJF]. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See id.  
 43. See Aaron Rieke et al., What ISPs Can See, UPTURN (Mar. 2016), 
https://www.upturn.org/reports/2016/what-isps-can-see/ [https://perma.cc/ 
3BYE-WHUY]. Servers of individual websites can also track information like 
which IP addresses visit which aspects of their website at what times of day. 
See, e.g., Log Files, APACHE HTTP SERVER PROJECT, https://httpd.apache.org/ 
docs/1.3/logs.html [https://perma.cc/XU25-TJ9Y]. However, owners of servers 
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be able to see URLs and content that users visit.44 URLs and 
content can reveal sensitive information about a user, including 
health problems, debts, and consumer product preferences.45 Do-
main names and IP addresses may be less revealing, but collec-
tively may give substantial insight into a person’s personal pre-
dilections.  
While a history of the IP addresses that a user visits can be 
revealing, the user’s own IP address may also provide infor-
mation about them. An IP address may provide a rough sense of 
location, and ISPs certainly know which user they have given 
which IP address.46 Though the accuracy will vary user to user, 
IP addresses could be used as a location-tracking tool.47 
All this information is potentially reachable and useful to 
law enforcement. If law enforcement comes across an IP address 
accessing contraband, they might ask an ISP to provide infor-
mation about who they issued that IP address to.48 Law enforce-
ment suspecting someone of accessing certain websites contain-
ing contraband might install a device to track which websites a 
person accesses.49 In some cases, law enforcement may want to 
request all of a person’s communications over Facebook or Twit-
ter to find evidence of a crime.50 To determine whether any or all 
of this conduct triggers Fourth Amendment protections, one 
 
are less likely to have access to the real name, address, and other identifying 
information associated with a user’s IP address. See id. 
 44. See Rieke et al., supra note 43. 
 45. Id.  
 46. See How Your IP Address Could Lead Anyone to Your Front Door, 
WHATISMYIPADDRESS.COM, https://whatismyipaddress.com/find-me 
[https://perma.cc/XRW8-3EE3]. 
 47. See, e.g., Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 118–20, United States v. Ul-
bricht, 858 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2017) (No. 15-1815), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2708 
(2018), 2016 WL 158389, at *118–20. 
 48. See, e.g., United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1199 (10th Cir. 2008) 
(“Pennsylvania authorities obtained another disclosure order requiring Cox to 
provide the subscriber information for that IP address.”). 
 49. See, e.g., Ulbricht, 858 F.3d at 95 (“[T]he government used five pen reg-
isters and trap and trace devices to monitor IP addresses associated with Inter-
net traffic to and from Ulbricht’s wireless home router and devices that regu-
larly connected to that router.”). 
 50. See, e.g., United States v. Brewer, No. 4:18-CR-215-CDP-NAB, 2018 WL 
7114606, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 12, 2018) (“Detective Burton learned that the 
arrangements for the sale of the heroin or fentanyl had been made through Fa-
cebook Messenger. The detective then applied for a search warrant . . . .”), report 
and recommendation adopted, No. 4:18CR00215 SNLJ, 2019 WL 319402 (E.D. 
Mo. Jan. 24, 2019). 
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must gaze into the Fourth Amendment law surrounding 
searches and seizures, an area of law that “has not—to put it 
mildly—run smooth.”51 
B. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE 
The modern test for when government conduct amounts to 
a Fourth Amendment search was first formulated in Katz v. 
United States.52 In Katz, the Court held that law enforcement 
had conducted a Fourth Amendment search when they bugged a 
public payphone.53 Recognizing that the Fourth Amendment 
protected “people, not places,”54 the Court rejected an earlier ap-
proach to the Fourth Amendment under cases like Olmstead v. 
United States, which required an invasion of a property interest 
for a Fourth Amendment search to occur.55 Justice Harlan’s con-
currence, later adopted by the Court in full,56 set out a two-prong 
test for when government collection of information constituted a 
search: (1) the person must exhibit a subjective expectation of 
privacy in the information; and (2) the expectation of privacy 
must be one that “society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasona-
ble.’”57  
The Supreme Court has recognized a notable exception to 
the Katz test in the third-party doctrine.58 The doctrine provides 
 
 51. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). 
 52. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 53. Id. at 353. 
 54. Id. at 351. 
 55. Id. at 352; see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), over-
ruled by Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
The Court has recently revived this approach to the Fourth Amendment, with 
the late Justice Scalia being the most fervent advocate of the claim that Katz 
did not overrule this line of cases, but merely added additional protections. See, 
e.g., Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 5 (2013) (“[T]hough Katz may add to the 
baseline, it does not subtract anything . . . .”); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 
400, 408 (2012) (“Katz did not narrow the Fourth Amendment’s scope.”). Justice 
Gorsuch has also expressed sympathy for this approach. See Carpenter v. 
United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2267–68 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
traditional approach asked if a house, paper or effect was yours under 
law. . . . Though now often lost in Katz’s shadow, this traditional understanding 
persists.”). 
 56. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (using Justice 
Harlan’s two-step formulation to frame the Fourth Amendment analysis). 
 57. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 58. For a more complete overview of the third-party doctrine background 
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that “if information is possessed or known by third parties, then, 
for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, an individual lacks a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the information.”59  
The first cases to recognize this limitation to Fourth Amend-
ment protections were cases that concerned the use of under-
cover informants, wires, and eavesdropping. Prior to Katz, the 
Court held in On Lee v. United States that there was not a Fourth 
Amendment problem with being informed upon by a friend wear-
ing a wire.60 In On Lee, Lee was selling opium from his laundry 
in Hoboken.61 Lee had a conversation about the opium with his 
friend, who turned out to be wearing a wire and acting as an 
undercover informant for the Bureau of Narcotics.62 The Court 
found that because the “friend” had entered with the consent of 
Lee, there was no Fourth Amendment violation.63 Three cases 
following On Lee confirmed that there was no Fourth Amend-
ment search when a suspect voluntarily disclosed information to 
an undercover informant.64 
Following Katz, the Court reassessed the question of 
whether undercover informants violated the Fourth Amend-
ment. After all, wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping did 
not violate the Fourth Amendment under the Olmstead regime 
because there had been no “official search” nor a “physical inva-
sion.”65 Yet, in United States v. White, the Court found that, de-
spite the change to the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test, 
 
prior to Carpenter, see Monu Bedi, The Fourth Amendment Disclosure Doc-
trines, 26 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 461 (2017); Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the 
Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV 561, 567–70 (2009). 
 59. Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 528 
(2006). 
 60. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952). 
 61. Id. at 748–49. 
 62. Id. at 749. 
 63. Id. at 753–54. 
 64. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (“Neither this 
Court nor any member of it has ever expressed the view that the Fourth Amend-
ment protects a wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a person to whom he volun-
tarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it.”); Lewis v. United States, 385 
U.S. 206, 209 (1966) (“[I]n the detection of many types of crime, the Government 
is entitled to use decoys and to conceal the identity of its agents.”); Lopez v. 
United States, 373 U.S. 427, 439 (1963) (“We think the risk that petitioner took 
in offering a bribe to Davis fairly included the risk that the offer would be accu-
rately reproduced in court, whether by faultless memory or mechanical record-
ing.”). 
 65. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 748 (1971) (plurality opinion). 
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there was still no Fourth Amendment violation when law en-
forcement listened in on conversations conducted by someone 
voluntarily wearing a wire.66 In White, James A. White was tried 
and convicted on narcotics charges.67 Law enforcement had sur-
reptitiously listened in on White’s conversations with one of their 
informants using a wire and radio equipment.68 The court of ap-
peals reversed the conviction, holding that Katz had overruled 
On Lee.69  
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals.70 The 
Court carried forward the precedent that a person carrying on 
conversation with another about illegal activities cannot reason-
ably expect privacy; they assume the risk of being informed 
upon.71 The Court noted that the Fourth Amendment could not 
protect against friends later reporting their conversations to the 
police.72 Given this precedent, the Court reasoned that lines 
could not be so finely drawn between the informant that merely 
reported what was said to the police and the informant that wore 
a wire.73 The logic thus survived Katz. 
Following White, cases in the 1970s found that information 
communicated in business records to businesses was the same 
as information communicated to undercover informants. In 
United States v. Miller, the government issued subpoenas to 
Mitch Miller’s bank to obtain “all records of [his] accounts.”74 
Without advising Miller, the bank turned over his incriminating 
records to the government.75 Holding that Miller had no reason-
able expectation of privacy in the bank records, the Court ex-
plained that Miller had “voluntarily conveyed” the records to the 
bank and that the information was “exposed to their employees 
in the ordinary course of business.”76 The Court thus extended 
the third-party doctrine beyond conversations to encompass 
 
 66. Id. at 750. 
 67. Id. at 746–47. 
 68. Id. at 747. 
 69. Id.  
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 752 (“Inescapably, one contemplating illegal activities must real-
ize and risk that his companions may be reporting to the police. . . . But if he 
has no doubts, or allays them, or risks what doubt he has, the risk is his.”). 
 72. Id. at 751. 
 73. Id. at 751–52. 
 74. 425 U.S. 435, 437 (1976). 
 75. Id. at 438. 
 76. Id. at 442. 
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business records. 
The third-party doctrine was expanded again in Smith v. 
Maryland.77 In Smith, Michael Lee Smith allegedly robbed Pa-
tricia McDonough and afterwards placed several obscene and 
threatening phone calls to her residence.78 Based on a descrip-
tion of Smith’s car, police identified Smith and requested the lo-
cal phone company to track the numbers dialed from Smith’s 
phone using a device called a “pen register.”79 Police made this 
request without a warrant.80 Upon review of the calls placed 
from Smith’s phone, police found that Smith had dialed 
McDonough’s number and, on that basis, obtained a search war-
rant for his home.81 This search revealed incriminating evi-
dence.82 The trial court denied Smith’s motion to suppress the 
pen register evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds and the 
appeals court affirmed.83 
The Supreme Court affirmed the appeals court ruling.84 Rec-
ognizing the reasonable expectation of privacy test discussed 
above,85 the Court rejected that Smith had either a subjective 
expectation of privacy, or an expectation of privacy that society 
was prepared to recognize as reasonable.86 In determining that 
Smith had no subjective expectation of privacy, the Court nar-
rowed in on the specific activity that Smith would have sought 
to preserve as private.87 Here, the Court distinguished between 
the “contents” of Smith’s communications and the numbers di-
aled. The Court reasoned that while Smith may have desired to 
conceal the content of his communication with McDonough by 
using the phone inside his private residence, he could not make 
the same claim about concealing the numbers he dialed.88 The 
Court concluded that even if Smith had a subjective expectation 
 
 77. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 78. Id. at 737. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 737–38. 
 84. Id. at 746. 
 85. Id. at 740. 
 86. Id. at 743–44. 
 87. Id. at 743 (“Although petitioner’s conduct may have been calculated to 
keep the contents of his conversation private, his conduct was not and could not 
have been calculated to preserve the privacy of the number he dialed.”). 
 88. Id. 
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of privacy, it was not one society was prepared to recognize as 
reasonable.89 The Court favorably quoted Miller and White, not-
ing that Smith had assumed the risk that the number he dialed 
would be turned over to the police by sending it to the phone 
company.90  
The Court then rejected two of Smith’s arguments notable 
for the electronic context. First, the Court concluded that auto-
mation made no difference.91 Despite the fact that Smith did not 
directly communicate the phone numbers to a human, he had 
still exposed his information by revealing it to the phone com-
pany’s equipment.92 Second, it did not matter whether the phone 
company regularly recorded phone numbers. Declining to make 
a “crazy quilt” out of the Fourth Amendment, the Court found 
the only significant fact was that Smith had exposed his phone 
number to a company with the capacity to record the infor-
mation.93 That alone meant the information could not be pro-
tected.  
C. COLLECTION OF INTERNET HISTORY BY THE GOVERNMENT 
Based on the Court’s holdings in Smith and Miller, one 
might expect that the third-party doctrine would render all in-
formation that ISPs collect on internet users available to law en-
forcement. Though this is broadly true, Congress has passed leg-
islation that adds some additional protections to internet history 
and subscriber information not covered by the Fourth Amend-
ment. This Section will explain how courts have applied the 
third-party doctrine to the internet and the two statutory mech-
anisms under the 1986 Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
of 1986 (ECPA)94 that define when law enforcement may compel 
an ISP to turn over an internet user’s records. 
1. Applying the Third-Party Doctrine to the Internet 
The Court decided Miller and Smith in the very early stages 
of the internet,95 likely without a concept of what the internet 
 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 744. 
 91. Id. at 744–45. 
 92. Id.  
 93. Id. at 744. 
 94. Pub. L. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 
(2012)). 
 95. See generally BARRY M. LEINER ET AL., INTERNET SOC’Y, BRIEF HISTORY 
OF THE INTERNET (1997), https://www.internetsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
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was to become (if the Justices were even aware of the internet). 
Though the Supreme Court has yet to rule conclusively on the 
application of the Fourth Amendment to the internet,96 lower 
court decisions have suggested that the third-party doctrine ap-
plies to much of the non-content internet history discussed 
above.97 Courts confronting the issue have uniformly concluded 
that basic subscriber information, IP addresses, and email ad-
dresses in the to/from lines are “addressing information” equiv-
alent to the phone numbers dialed in Smith.98  
In United States v. Forrester, the Ninth Circuit held that 
these pieces of information were “constitutionally indistinguish-
able” from the information in Smith.99 The Forrester court first 
reasoned that, like the phone numbers in Smith, users know or 
should know that this information is necessary to route the con-
tent information.100 Thus, any information turned over was 
turned over “voluntarily.”101 Second, the court held that this in-
formation was not itself content information because it could 
only reveal as much content as a phone number could.102 Be-
 
2017/09/ISOC-History-of-the-Internet_1997.pdf [https://perma.cc/3LVU-HLGZ] 
(providing a brief overview of the history of the internet); LO AND BEHOLD, REV-
ERIES OF THE CONNECTED WORLD (Magnolia Pictures 2016) (reflecting on the 
history of and future possibilities for the internet). 
 96. Cf. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., con-
curring) (“[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual 
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to 
third parties. . . . This approach is ill suited to the digital age . . . .”). 
 97. See supra Part I.A. 
 98. See, e.g., United States v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 574 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(“[N]o reasonable expectation of privacy exists in an IP address . . . .”); United 
States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1204 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Every federal court to 
address this issue has held that subscriber information provided to an internet 
provider is not protected by the Fourth Amendment’s privacy expectation.”); 
United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that 
computer surveillance to obtain “to/from addresses of e-mail messages, the IP 
addresses of websites visited and the total amount of data transmitted to or 
from an account” did not require warrant protections). 
 99. Forrester, 512 F.3d at 510. 
 100. Id. (“Internet users have no expectation of privacy in the to/from ad-
dresses of their messages or the IP addresses of the websites they visit because 
they should know that this information is provided to and used by Internet ser-
vice providers for the specific purpose of directing the routing of information.”). 
 101. Id. 
 102. See id. (“[W]hen an individual dials a pre-recorded information or sub-
ject-specific line, such as sports scores, lottery results or phone sex lines, the 
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cause the Smith Court had already concluded that phone num-
bers were not content, this kind of internet history could not be 
content either.103 The court analogized this information to the 
information on the outside of an envelope—people have a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in information inside in the enve-
lope (the content), but not the non-content addressing infor-
mation on the outside of the envelope.104 
The Forrester court and other courts have, however, afforded 
protections to content information on the internet. The Forrester 
court exempted URLs from its analysis, noting that a “URL, un-
like an IP address, identifies the particular document within a 
website that a person views and thus reveals much more infor-
mation about the person’s internet activity.”105 The content of an 
email is also protected by the Fourth Amendment and requires 
a warrant based on probable cause.106  
Despite non-content and subscriber information not being 
protected under the Fourth Amendment, Congress has stepped 
in to afford some limited protections to disclosure of this infor-
mation by the companies that hold it. 
2. Statutory Mechanisms: The Stored Communications Act 
and the Pen/Trap Statute 
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986107 pro-
vides procedures by which the government can obtain infor-
mation about a user’s internet activity. One of the ways that the 
government can obtain internet traffic information is by request-
ing it through “electronic communications services,” typically 
 
phone number may even show that the caller had access to specific content in-
formation.”). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 511 (“E-mail, like physical mail, has an outside address ‘visible’ 
to the third-party carriers that transmit it to its intended location, and also a 
package of content that the sender presumes will be read only by the intended 
recipient. The privacy interests in these two forms of communication are iden-
tical. The contents may deserve Fourth Amendment protection, but the address 
and size of the package do not.”). 
 105. Id. at 510 n.6. 
 106. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010) (“The gov-
ernment may not compel a commercial ISP to turn over the contents of a sub-
scriber’s emails without first obtaining a warrant based on probable cause.”); 
see also United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1306–07 (10th Cir. 2016). 
 107. Pub. L. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 
(2012)). 
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ISPs.108 The Stored Communications Act (SCA),109 Title II of the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, governs how 
the government may compel providers to disclose stored elec-
tronic communications.110  
The government may obtain internet traffic information 
from an ISP through a court order under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (a 
D order).111 A D order allows law enforcement to obtain most rec-
ords of user information held by ISPs, including subscriber in-
formation and records of IP addresses visited by a particular 
user.112 Under § 2703, “[a] court order . . . shall issue only if the 
governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts showing 
that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the . . . rec-
ords . . . are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal inves-
tigation.”113 Legislative history and subsequent court interpre-
tations of this Section have suggested that this is a standard 
lower than probable cause, similar to the reasonable suspicion 
standard articulated in Terry v. Ohio.114 
If the government only wants to find out the identity of a 
person associated with a known IP address, the standard is even 
lower. Basic subscriber information, including a person’s name, 
address, records of lengths of connection, and sources of pay-
ment, is available upon subpoena.115 The standard for issuing a 
subpoena is even more lenient than the specific and articulable 
facts standard required for a D order.116 
 
 108. For a discussion of what constitutes an “electronic service provider” un-
der the Stored Communications Act, see H. MARSHALL JARRETT ET AL., OFFICE 
OF LEGAL EDUC., SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELEC-
TRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 117–19 (2009), https://www 
.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-ccips/legacy/2015/01/14/ssmanual2009 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/8QEU-PA64]. 
 109. Pub. L. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 
(2012)). The phrase “Stored Communications Act” appears nowhere in the stat-
ute, but that is how it is popularly referred to. See JARRETT ET AL., supra note 
108, at 115 n.1.  
 110. 18 U.S.C. § 2703. 
 111. JARRETT et al., supra note 108, at 130. 
 112. See id. at 130–32. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 131; see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–27 (1968) (describing the 
standard).  
 115. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2). 
 116. JARRETT ET AL., supra note 108, at 128 (“The legal threshold for issuing 
a subpoena is low. . . . Investigators may obtain disclosure pursuant to 
§ 2703(c)(2) using any federal or state grand jury or trial subpoena or an admin-
istrative subpoena authorized by a federal or state statute.”). 
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If the government, however, wishes to obtain information 
about internet activity in real-time, they may seek to compel in-
stallation of a pen register and/or a trap and trace device.117 
Whereas monitoring an internet user’s content in real-time 
would be governed by the federal Wiretap Act,118 the government 
can monitor “addressing information” under a lower standard 
using the Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices (Pen/Trap 
Statute or PTS) chapter of Title 18.119 
In the telephony context, pen registers and trap and trace 
devices are distinct. Pen registers monitor outgoing numbers 
and trap and trace devices monitor incoming numbers.120 In the 
internet context, both incoming and outgoing information is con-
tained in the same entity, called a header.121 So, the devices used 
to capture internet headers in real-time are called “pen/trap” de-
vices.122 Used in the internet context, these devices may capture 
“almost all non-content information in a communication.”123 In 
other words, these devices can capture the IP addresses of com-
puters receiving and sending messages, port numbers, and email 
to/from addresses. The standard to meet for ordering installation 
of a pen/trap device is lower than the specific and articulable 
facts standard of a D order; the government may order the in-
stallation if “the information likely to be obtained is relevant to 
an ongoing criminal investigation.”124 
D. CARPENTER AND A NEW FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS 
In 2011, after a series of robberies of cell phone and electron-
ics stores in Michigan and Ohio, police arrested a suspect that 
told them about several accomplices to the robberies.125 One of 
these accomplices was Timothy Carpenter.126 Under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2703(d), law enforcement obtained court orders requesting 
that MetroPCS and Sprint produce over 150 days of records 
 
 117. See id. at 151. 
 118. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522.  
 119. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–3127. 
 120. See JARRETT ET AL., supra note 108, at 153–54. 
 121. Id. at 154. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b)(2). 
 125. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212 (2018). 
 126. Id. 
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showing the location of Carpenter’s cell phone during these rob-
beries.127 These requests produced over 12,000 data points on 
Carpenter’s location.128 Law enforcement arrested Carpenter 
and charged him with several counts of robbery and carrying a 
firearm during a crime of violence.129 The District Court denied 
Carpenter’s motion to suppress the cell-site records.130 At trial, 
an FBI agent testified about the cell phone location data and 
showed maps that illustrated that Carpenter’s phone had been 
near the sites of four of the robberies.131 Carpenter was con-
victed, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding in part that Car-
penter lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the histori-
cal cell-site location data.132  
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. The 
Court held that law enforcement collection of seven days of his-
torical cell-site location information (CSLI) was a Fourth 
Amendment search, which required a warrant.133 The Court held 
first that the information collected invaded Carpenter’s reason-
able expectation of privacy, and second, that the third-party doc-
trine did not govern this case.134 For the purposes of this Note, 
there are a number of salient takeaways from the Court’s opin-
ion. 
First, in finding that law enforcement’s access to historical 
CSLI invaded Carpenter’s reasonable expectation of privacy, the 
Court recognized that it was not merely concerned with move-
ments, but the private personal information one might discover 
in knowing about someone’s movements.135 The Court adopted 
Justice Sotomayor’s reasoning from her concurrence in United 
States v. Jones: “[T]he time-stamped data provides an intimate 
window into a person’s life, revealing not only his particular 
 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 2212–13. 
 132. United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 890 (6th Cir. 2016) (“In sum, 
we hold that the government’s collection of business records containing cell-site 
data was not a search under the Fourth Amendment.”), rev’d and remanded, 
138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
 133. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217. 
 134. Id. at 2219–20. 
 135. Id.  
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movements, but through them his ‘familial, political, profes-
sional, religious, and sexual associations.’”136 To wit, the Court 
appeared not only concerned by geolocation data but by data gen-
erally that can provide a comprehensive picture of a person’s 
habits.137 
Second, the Court outlined a broad set of attributes about 
the data collected and the manner of data collection that it finds 
important. Relevant factors include: (1) that the data are “deeply 
revealing”; (2) that the data are deep, broad, and comprehensive; 
and (3) that the data collection was “inescapable and auto-
matic.”138 Furthermore, the Court expressed a concern about the 
cost efficiency of data collection, remarking that collection of his-
torical CSLI is “easy, cheap, and efficient compared to tradi-
tional investigative tools.”139 
Third, the Court rejected the government’s arguments for 
the application of the third-party doctrine in the context of his-
torical CSLI. The Court noted that “seismic shifts in digital tech-
nology” undercut the argument in Smith that disclosure of infor-
mation to a human and to technology were indistinguishable.140 
Instead, the Court seemed to say that information that has the 
attributes described above is a “distinct category of information” 
deserving of special treatment: “Sprint Corporation and its com-
petitors are not your typical witnesses. Unlike the nosy neighbor 
who keeps an eye on comings and goings, they are ever alert, and 
their memory is nearly infallible.”141 
The Court reasoned that neither the limited intrusion nor 
the voluntary exposure justifications of the third-party doctrine 
applied to historical CSLI. The Court interpreted Smith and Mil-
ler to require an examination of the “nature of the particular doc-
uments” sought by law enforcement.142 Because historical CSLI 
 
 136. Id. at 2217 (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring)). 
 137. But see id. at 2219–20 (noting that the Court does have a “special solic-
itude” for location information). 
 138. Id. at 2223. Though this Note will refer to these attributes as the Car-
penter “factors,” it is important to note that these factors do not constitute a 
rigid multi-part test and only represent attributes of CSLI that the court con-
sidered important. For a more comprehensive look into each of these factors, see 
Paul Ohm, The Many Revolutions of Carpenter, 32 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 357 
(2019). 
 139. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218. 
 140. Id. at 2219. 
 141. Id.  
 142. Id.  
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gave law enforcement easy access to comprehensive chronicle of 
a person’s movements, it was not the same as the checks in Mil-
ler or the telephone logs in Smith.143 Access to historical CSLI 
could not therefore be a limited intrusion.  
Further, the voluntary exposure rationale was suspect. The 
Court recognized that the use of a cell phone had become “indis-
pensable to participation in modern society” and that “[v]irtually 
any activity” on a phone generated CSLI.144 Because a phone au-
tomatically generated CSLI, often with no “affirmative act” on 
the part of the user, users were not voluntarily exposing their 
physical location in any “meaningful sense.”145 
Finally, the Court concluded that because access to histori-
cal CSLI constituted a Fourth Amendment search, law enforce-
ment must obtain a warrant founded upon probable cause before 
accessing historical CSLI.146 Though the Court recognized that 
there may be situations where law enforcement may not be re-
quired to obtain a warrant, like responding to an emergency, the 
Court concluded that a warrant was required in the “mine-run 
criminal investigation.”147 
II.  PRIVACY OF INTERNET HISTORY IS CURRENTLY 
INADEQUATELY PROTECTED   
This Part will show that lower courts are shying away from 
a broad application of the reasoning of Carpenter, leaving inter-
net history under-protected. First, this Part will show that deci-
sions in the wake of Carpenter have focused on physical location 
and the specific factual circumstances of Carpenter itself instead 
of applying the reasoning of the decision. Next, this Part will 
suggest that this lack of extension is not only a missed oppor-
tunity but leaves internet history insufficiently protected from 
government intrusion. Finally, this Part will attempt to illus-
trate the value of internet privacy and explain why it might de-
serve greater protections in a democratic society. 
 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 2220. 
 145. Id.  
 146. Id. at 2221. 
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A. COURTS ARE RELUCTANT TO BROADLY EXTEND CARPENTER 
TO THE INTERNET 
Though many initial cases following Carpenter did not have 
to consider its applicability to new facts owing to the good faith 
exception,148 cases have increasingly had to confront Carpenter’s 
applicability to new sets of facts. But courts have hesitated to 
extend Carpenter to facts not dealt with in the opinion, including 
government collection of pole camera footage,149 real-time GPS 
location information,150 and utility records.151 A few cases bear 
directly on the question considered in this Note: whether Car-
penter can be read to apply to internet history information, in-
cluding information that associates an individual with an IP ad-
dress. 
In United States v. Contreras, the Fifth Circuit considered 
whether Carpenter applied when an ISP provided an IP address 
that identified where a person resides.152 In Contreras, law en-
forcement discovered that a computer associated with an IP ad-
dress had uploaded “sexually graphic images” of children to Kik, 
an internet messaging service.153 Law enforcement discovered 
that Frontier Communications, an ISP, had provided the IP ad-
dress to one of their users, and the Northern District of Florida 
issued a grand jury subpoena to Frontier for the subscriber in-
formation associated with the IP address.154 Frontier gave law 
enforcement the information, including the home address of the 
subscriber.155 Based on this information, a court granted a 
search warrant for the residence.156 Law enforcement executed 
 
 148. Nathaniel Sobel, Four Months Later, How Are Courts Interpreting Car-
penter?, LAWFARE (Oct. 18, 2018, 8:57 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/four 
-months-later-how-are-courts-interpreting-carpenter  
[https://perma.cc/8SS2-5HPN]. 
 149. United States v. Kubasiak, No. 18-CR-120-PP, 2018 WL 4846761, at *6 
(E.D. Wis. Oct. 5, 2018); United States v. Tirado, No. 16-CR-168, 2018 WL 
3995901, at *1–2 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 21, 2018). 
 150. State v. Sylvestre, 254 So. 3d 986, 989–90 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018). 
 151. United States v. Lightfoot, No. CR 17-0274, 2018 WL 4376509, at *6 
(W.D. La. Aug. 30, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. CR 17-0274, 
2018 WL 4374196 (W.D. La. Sept. 13, 2018). 
 152. 905 F.3d 853, 857 (5th Cir. 2018). 
 153. Id. at 855. 
 154. Id. at 855–56. 
 155. Id. at 856. 
 156. Id. 
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the warrant and discovered numerous videos depicting the sex-
ual abuse of children.157 The resident, Sebastian Contreras, was 
arrested, charged, and convicted of transportation and receipt of 
child pornography.158 
Contreras argued on appeal that, considering Carpenter, 
law enforcement should have obtained a warrant to get the sub-
scriber information from Frontier.159 The Fifth Circuit quickly 
dismissed this attempt to extend Carpenter.160 Judge Higginson 
wrote that this information fell “comfortably within the scope of 
the third-party doctrine.”161 Though the court acknowledged 
that Carpenter limited the power of the third-party doctrine, the 
court read Carpenter to require that the information collected 
bear on a person’s “day-to-day movement.”162 The information 
provided to law enforcement only indicated Contreras’s presence 
at his residence and nowhere else.163 Thus, Carpenter did not ap-
ply.164 
Numerous courts have reached similar results.165 Courts 
have rejected applying Carpenter to IP addresses and subscriber 
 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 856–57. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. The First Circuit also concluded that third-party doctrine continued to 
apply to IP address information after Carpenter. United States v. Hood, 920 
F.3d 87, 92 (1st Cir. 2019) (“[A]n internet user generates the IP address data 
that the government acquired from Kik in this case only by making the affirm-
ative decision to access a website or application. By contrast, as the Supreme 
Court noted in Carpenter, every time a cell phone receives a call, text message, 
or email, the cell phone pings CSLI to the nearest cell site tower without the 
cell phone user lifting a finger. . . . Thus, the government’s warrantless acquisi-
tion from Kik of the IP address data at issue here in no way gives rise to the 
unusual concern that the Supreme Court identified in Carpenter . . . . Accord-
ingly, we conclude that Hood did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the information that the government acquired from Kik without a warrant.”). 
The Ninth and Fourth Circuits have also declined to extend Carpenter to IP 
address information, albeit in non-precedential opinions. United States v. 
VanDyck, 776 F. App’x 495, 496 (9th Cir. 2019) (“VanDyck argues that the evi-
dence should be suppressed because the Fourth Amendment required a warrant 
to obtain the subscriber information associated with the IP address . . . . [W]e 
decline to extend Carpenter to encompass the argument advanced by 
VanDyck.”); United States v. Wellbeloved-Stone, No. 18-4573, 2019 WL 
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information because the information is not detailed enough,166 
not a comprehensive account of day-to-day movement,167 or be-
cause Carpenter itself remarked that it was a narrow decision.168 
Some courts have cited all three reasons.169 
Though most courts have been skeptical about extending 
Carpenter to cover digital footprints, one decision in the District 
Court of Rhode Island seemed to recognize the possibility that 
 
2474025, at *2 (4th Cir. June 13, 2019) (per curiam) (“Wellbeloved-Stone con-
tends that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his IP address and 
subscriber information after Carpenter . . . . The Court explicitly emphasized 
the narrow scope of its holding, and Wellbeloved-Stone cites no post-Carpenter 
authority extending Carpenter’s rationale to IP addresses or subscriber infor-
mation.” (citation omitted)). Many federal district courts and some state courts 
have been similarly unpersuaded. See, e.g., infra notes 166–70. 
 166. United States v. McCutchin, No. CR-17-01517-001-TUC-JAS (BPV), 
2019 WL 1075544, at *2 (D. Ariz. Mar. 7, 2019) (“The internet subscriber infor-
mation differs drastically from the CSLI obtained in Carpenter. It provides busi-
ness records that are not detailed or encyclopedic. Subscriber information does 
not reveal familial, political, professional, religious, sexual associations, or loca-
tion.”); United States v. Tolbert, 326 F. Supp. 3d 1211, 1225 (D.N.M. 2018) (“The 
privacy interest in this type of identifying data, which presumably any AOL or 
CenturyLink employee could access during the regular course of business, 
simply does not rise to the level of the evidence in Carpenter such that it would 
require law enforcement to obtain a search warrant.”). 
 167. Brown v. Sprint Corp. Sec. Specialist, No. 17-CV-2561(JS)(ARL), 2019 
WL 418100, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2019) (“Carpenter focuses on the intrusion 
of tracking a person’s physical movements, which Plaintiff does not allege is at 
issue here.”); see also United States v. Germain, No. 2:18-cr-00026, 2019 WL 
1970779, at *4 (D. Vt. May 3, 2019); United States v. Jenkins, No. 1:18-cr-00181, 
2019 WL 1568154, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 11, 2019); United States v. Popa, 369 F. 
Supp. 3d 833, 838 (N.D. Ohio 2019); United States v. Streett, 363 F. Supp. 3d 
1212, 1309 (D.N.M. 2018); United States v. Gregory, No. 8:18CR139, 2018 WL 
6427871, at *2 (D. Neb. Dec. 7, 2018); People v. Sime, 88 N.Y.S.3d 823, 826 (N.Y. 
Crim. Ct. 2018). 
 168. Cryer v. Idaho Dep’t of Labor, No. 1:16-cv-00526-BLW, 2018 WL 
3636529, at *1 n.1 (D. Idaho July 30, 2018); United States v. Westley, No. 3:17-
CR-171 (MPS), 2018 WL 3448161, at *14 n.9 (D. Conn. July 17, 2018). 
 169. United States v. Felton, 367 F. Supp. 3d 569, 575 (W.D. La. 2019) (“Fel-
ton’s use of the IP address is not so closely related to his ‘home’ that the Court 
can say that there is a privacy interest as to his papers and personal effects. 
Second, the logs obtained from the USPS do not track Felton’s every movement 
of every day; they only identify the fact that Felton was tracking the packages. 
The Court further recognizes the very narrow ruling in Carpenter and finds that 
it does not govern this case. Thus, the Court concludes that there was no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy as to the information provided by Comcast (Fel-
ton’s IP address) and the content of the communication between Felton’s IP ad-
dress and the USPS server.”); see also United States v. Therrien, No. 2:18-cr-
00085, 2019 WL 1147479, at *2 (D. Vt. Mar. 13, 2019). 
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Carpenter could apply to “exhaustive chronicle[s]” of digital ac-
tivities and not just to physical activities.170 In United States v. 
Monroe, law enforcement obtained a D order requesting that a 
website disclose the IP addresses of users that had downloaded 
video files depicting child pornography.171 Law enforcement, us-
ing publicly available information on the internet, then learned 
which ISP issued these IP addresses and subpoenaed subscriber 
information to learn the identity of the users, including one Jor-
dan Monroe.172 Using this information, law enforcement ob-
tained a search warrant for Monroe’s residence and discovered a 
collection of child pornography.173  
Monroe moved to exclude the evidence of his IP address ob-
tained via the D order, arguing that the Carpenter reasoning 
should apply to IP addresses.174 The court rejected this argu-
ment, observing that an IP address is more like the information 
in Smith and Miller.175 “An IP address,” the court argued, “is one 
link held by a third party in a chain of information that may lead 
to a particular person. It does not reveal the kind of minutely 
detailed, historical portrait of ‘the whole of [a person’s] physical 
movements’ that concerned the Supreme Court in Carpen-
ter . . . .”176 But the court appears to have based its holding on its 
perception that law enforcement could glean little information 
from an IP address without further investigation.177 The Monroe 
court seemingly recognized that if digital information, even in-
formation outside of CSLI, reached a certain level of intrusive-
ness, the Carpenter analysis could be appropriate.178 
The Monroe court’s willingness to even consider digital ac-
tivities under the framework of Carpenter is a rarity. Most courts 
continue to dismiss the possibility that IP addresses and sub-
scriber information are subject to Carpenter’s new Fourth 
Amendment analysis. Although commentators expressed that 
 
 170. United States v. Monroe, 350 F. Supp. 3d 43, 48 (D.R.I. 2018) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 
2219 (2018)). 
 171. Id. at 44–45. 
 172. Id. at 44. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 49. 
 176. Id. (quoting Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018)). 
 177. See id. at 48. 
 178. See id. 
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Carpenter could have been a watershed moment for digital pri-
vacy, the current trend in the courts locks in the existing inade-
quate privacy schemes. 
B. INTERNET HISTORY IS NOT SUFFICIENTLY PROTECTED BY 
CURRENT PRIVACY SCHEMES 
Three concerns demonstrate that internet privacy may be in 
a precarious spot under current privacy schemes. First, the use 
of internet history information by law enforcement shows no 
signs of slowing and companies are not providing a meaningful 
check on information provided to law enforcement. Transpar-
ency reports by Google,179 Twitter,180 Facebook,181 and large 
ISPs182 all show that they continue to receive thousands of re-
quests from law enforcement for information. In most cases, a 
company will provide at least some user information in response 
to a government request.183 Though companies may often have 
incentives to protect user information and perhaps comply min-
imally with these requests,184 companies are still providing the 
government with user information which threatens a user’s pri-
vacy. 
 
 179. Requests for User Information – Google Transparency Report, GOOGLE, 
https://transparencyreport.google.com/user-data/overview?hl=en [https://perma 
.cc/9X7Y-AXF8]. 
 180. United States of America, TWITTER, https://transparency.twitter.com/ 
en/countries/us.html [https://perma.cc/T4XH-YPT4]. 
 181. Requests for User Data – United States, FACEBOOK,  
https://transparency.facebook.com/government-data-requests/country/US (last 
visited Mar. 6, 2019). 
 182. COMCAST TRANSPARENCY REPORT: JANUARY 1, 2018 – JUNE 30, 2018 
(2018), https://update.comcast.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/33/dlm_uploads/ 
2018/12/Comcast-Tenth-Transparency-Report-FINAL-Dec-2018-1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6MD5-W3Q8]; Transparency Report, AT&T, https://about.att 
.com/csr/home/frequently-requested-info/governance/transparencyreport.html 
[https://perma.cc/9HT2-39RD]; see also Transparency Reporting Index, ACCESS 
NOW, https://www.accessnow.org/transparency-reporting-index/ [https://perma 
.cc/8LSG-8VPQ] (last updated 2016). 
 183. See, e.g., Requests for User Data – United States, supra note 181 (show-
ing that Facebook provided the government with some user information in re-
sponse to 86% of requests). 
 184. See generally Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Surveillance Intermediaries, 70 
STAN. L. REV. 99 (2018) (explaining that companies that serve as “surveillance 
intermediaries” between the government and a user often have financial and 
ideological incentives that do not align with government interests).  
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Second, while the SCA and the PTS would seem to provide 
some protections for internet users, the protections are very lim-
ited. All so-called non-content information can be obtained from 
a provider under a reasonable suspicion standard, and pen/trap 
devices may be installed on a showing of mere relevance.185 Even 
though law enforcement may often possess more than probable 
cause in internet investigations when they seek to obtain addi-
tional information,186 the increased use of the internet for all 
kinds of daily communication and transactions will increase in-
centives for law enforcement to argue for access to large portions 
of a suspect’s internet history.187  
Third, even if the SCA and PTS were protective, the statutes 
lack real bite in the event they are not followed. Suppression of 
evidence is not available for nonconstitutional violations of the 
SCA or PTS.188 Because most conduct under these statutes 
would not constitute a search,189 a suspect that demonstrated 
that the government had not made the proper showing, but re-
ceived the court order anyways, could not then exclude the evi-
dence. Thus, a person subject to internet surveillance lacks pro-
tection at the front and back end of the search.190 
 
 185. See supra Part I.C.2. 
 186. Cf. Paul Ohm, Probably Probable Cause: The Diminishing Importance 
of Justification Standards, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1514 (2010). Professor Ohm argues 
that the justification standards (probable cause, reasonable suspicion, and the 
like) matter less in internet investigations where law enforcement is less likely 
to encounter a naked IP address in the wild. Id. Importantly, Ohm notes that 
fishing expeditions are one area where justification standards are likely to re-
main significant. Id. at 1550.  
 187. See Jennifer Stisa Granick, If the Government Had Its Way, Everything 
Could Be Wiretapped, ACLU (Feb. 19, 2019, 10:30 AM), https://www.aclu.org/ 
blog/privacy-technology/internet-privacy/if-government-had-its-way 
-everything-could-be-wiretapped [https://perma.cc/99BL-38LV]. 
 188. 18 U.S.C. § 2708 (2012) (“The remedies and sanctions described in this 
chapter are the only judicial remedies and sanctions for nonconstitutional vio-
lations of this chapter.”); see United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th 
Cir. 2008) (citing several cases for the proposition that violations of the Acts do 
not merit exclusion of evidence). 
 189. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 190. This Note argues that protection on the front end is important. For a 
compelling argument (one that this author agrees with) that the exclusionary 
rule should be added statutorily to protect the back end of the search, see Orin 
S. Kerr, Lifting the “Fog” of Internet Surveillance: How a Suppression Remedy 
Would Change Computer Crime Law, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 805 (2003). 
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C. A LOSS OF INTERNET PRIVACY IS HARMFUL TO SOCIETY 
The Fourth Amendment and its protections are at the heart 
of American democracy. In 18th-century America, colonists had 
become excellent smugglers and pirates, defying the Crown’s at-
tempts to mandate that the colonies only trade with Britain.191 
In response, the Crown authorized writs of assistance.192 A writ 
of assistance allowed agents of the Crown to search broadly for 
smuggled goods without “a sworn declaration, notice, or probable 
cause.”193 In a five-hour oration before the Massachusetts State 
House, a young lawyer named James Otis, Jr. disputed the le-
gality of the writs in defense of fifty-three Boston merchants.194 
Otis called the writs the “worst instrument of arbitrary power, 
the most destructive of English liberty . . . that was ever found 
in an English law-book.”195 Otis lost his case.196 But John Adams, 
an audience member to Otis’s oration would later write in a let-
ter to William Tudor: “Then and there, the child independence 
was born.”197  
Otis’s words in opposition to the writs of assistance loom 
large in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.198 There is clear doc-
trinal support for this conception of privacy. But merely because 
citizens have challenged government conduct in the past does 
not necessarily mean that the same issues pervade today. In-
deed, numerous reports on the “death” of privacy suggest that 
people may not possess the concerns that Otis had with govern-
mental overreach.199 Because privacy is a notoriously slippery 
 
 191. Philip Foglia, The Lawyer Who Lit the Fuse of the American Revolution, 
N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J., Mar./Apr. 2015, at 26, 26. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. at 27. 
 194. Id.  
 195. Id. at 28. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018); Stan-
ford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481 (1965); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 
(1886). 
 199. See, e.g., Geoff Duncan, Zuckerberg: Online Privacy Is Not a “Social 
Norm,” DIGITAL TRENDS (Jan. 11, 2010, 9:32 AM), https://www.digitaltrends 
.com/social-media/zuckerberg-online-privacy-is-not-a-social-norm/ 
[https://perma.cc/3HMW-GK9A]; John H. Fleming & Amy Adkins, Data Secu-
rity: Not a Big Concern for Millennials, GALLUP (June 9, 2016), https://news 
.gallup.com/businessjournal/192401/data-security-not-big-concern-millennials 
.aspx [https://perma.cc/SZ65-CR7C] (“[M]illennials are the generation that is 
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concept200 and because there may be some question of its value 
in a digital age,201 mounting a defense of internet privacy may 
help elucidate why we might want to preserve it even if we are 
not diehard Otis-ites. 
The right of privacy was famously described by Justice Louis 
Brandeis as “the right to be let alone.”202 Alan F. Westin ex-
panded upon this definition in his influential treatise on privacy, 
describing privacy as the ability to control “when, how, and to 
what extent information about them is communicated to oth-
ers.”203 For Westin, the individual’s ability to control disclosure 
of information about them to certain parties and society writ 
large fostered four interrelated functions for individuals in a de-
mocracy: personal autonomy, emotional release, self-evaluation, 
and limited and protected communication.204 The relevant as-
pects of these functions for internet privacy are considered be-
low. 
Personal autonomy is the ability to “avoid being manipu-
lated or dominated wholly by others.”205 For Westin, democracies 
recognize that human dignity requires that humans be able to 
 
most trusting of institutions to safeguard their personal data.”); Is Online Pri-
vacy Over?, CTR. FOR DIGITAL FUTURE (Apr. 22, 2013), https://www 
.digitalcenter.org/online-privacy-and-millennials-0413/ [https://perma.cc/2RP2 
-RD7U]; Eric Limer, CES 2018’s Hot New Trend: The Total Death of Privacy, 
POPULAR MECHANICS (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.popularmechanics.com/ 
technology/security/a15045965/2018s-hot-new-tech-trend-is-the-death-of 
-privacy/ [https://perma.cc/C3PN-B97Q]; Alex Preston, The Death of Privacy, 
GUARDIAN (Aug. 3, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/03/ 
internet-death-privacy-google-facebook-alex-preston [https://perma.cc/MW8N 
-4YJ7]. Privacy’s death has likely been greatly exaggerated. See DAVID GRAY, 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN AN AGE OF SURVEILLANCE 14 (2017) (“Everyone 
values privacy. Different people just draw different boundaries. That is true 
even of millennials.”). 
 200. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 1–8 (2008) (arguing 
privacy rights arguments often fail due to a failure to fully conceptualize pri-
vacy); see also Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 
1934, 1935 (2013) (“[O]ur society lacks an understanding of why (and when) 
government surveillance is harmful.”). 
 201. See supra note 199. 
 202. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. 
New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
 203. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967). 
 204. Id. at 32. 
 205. Id. at 33. 
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preserve and protect a “core” of individuality.206 Further, devel-
opment of independent and diverse thought requires that hu-
mans be able to experiment in private.207 A lack of privacy could 
have a levelling effect, leaving people afraid to express thoughts 
too far outside the mainstream.208 
Societies must also allow individuals the opportunity for 
emotional release. People play different social roles in different 
situations, each coming with their own sets of expectations and 
permitted behaviors.209 Westin argues that not only do people 
need time off from playing their different social roles, it is neces-
sary to have enough privacy to complain about others.210 People 
should have enough privacy, Westin argues, such that they can 
express commentary that is not First Amendment-protected 
speech, commentary that is “wholly unfair, frivolous, nasty, and 
libelous.”211 This serves as a “safety-valve” in a democracy, al-
lowing people to complain about authority in private while de-
veloping measured speech for public presentation.212 Moreover, 
privacy in this domain allows society to accommodate minor in-
fractions of the law.213 Whereas society may be forced to take 
action if it knew of all lawbreaking behavior, a hardy right to 
privacy allows the state to place minor infractions or mere sus-
picions of lawbreaking beyond its cognition.214 
Further, privacy is necessary for self-evaluation to occur. 
The ability to “integrate” one’s experiences in private not only 
facilitates creative thought but allows people to measure their 
 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at 34. 
 208. Cf. FOUCAULT, supra note 1, at 202–03 (“He who is subjected to a field 
of visibility, and who know it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of 
power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself 
the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the 
principle of his own subjection.”). For an argument that the revelation of online 
pornography preferences could have this type of levelling effect, further disci-
plining the difference of already marginalized groups, see Elena Maris et al., 
Tracking Sex: The Implications of Widespread Sexual Data Leakage and Track-
ing on Porn Websites 5–7 (July 15, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1907.06520.pdf [https://perma.cc/4NCG-T7ZD]. 
 209. See WESTIN, supra note 203, at 35. 
 210. See id. at 35–36. 
 211. Id. at 36. 
 212. Id. at 35–36. 
 213. Id. at 35. 
 214. Id. 
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performance against their personal ideals.215 For Westin, the 
ability to take “moral inventory” of one’s actions in private brings 
the “conscience into play,” allowing people to improve them-
selves.216  
Finally, privacy allows for limited and protected communi-
cation. The ability to choose the subject, extent, and recipient of 
one’s disclosures permits individuals to maintain relationships 
and guard their associations with “doctors, lawyers, ministers, 
psychiatrists, psychologists, and others.”217 Anonymity in com-
munication and action can allow better testing of ideas and pre-
vent unwanted government intrusion.218 
These functions are active on the internet. People express 
themselves on the internet; they make associations with political 
groups; they buy things; they seek legal, medical, or spiritual ad-
vice. In other corners of the internet, people are “trolls,” “individ-
ual[s] who post[]  false accusations or inflammatory remarks on 
social media to promote a cause or to harass someone.”219 Where 
this conduct is anonymous or is otherwise known to limited par-
ties and does not rise to the level of major criminal activity, it 
promotes Westin’s functions. The choice of which forum to ex-
press oneself in should not significantly modify Westin’s analy-
sis.220 Against all odds, even internet trolls can serve a demo-
cratic function. 
Carpenter’s rationale appears to recognize Westin’s basic 
functions of privacy. Facts of modern life have allowed compa-
nies to amass lengthy histories of internet users’ activities, con-
taining sensitive information about a user’s beliefs, thoughts, 
 
 215. Id. at 36–37. 
 216. Id. at 37. 
 217. Id. at 38. 
 218. See id. at 31–32. 
 219. Definition of: Internet Troll, PCMAG.COM, https://www.pcmag.com/ 
encyclopedia/term/68609/internet-troll [https://perma.cc/X65Y-LSQM]. 
 220. Though, the potential existence of a privacy paradox may complicate 
matters. Some research has suggested that people make decisions regarding 
their privacy online that does not square with their attitudes and intentions 
toward privacy. See Susanne Barth & Menno D.T. de Jong, The Privacy Paradox 
– Investigating Discrepancies Between Expressed Privacy Concerns and Actual 
Online Behavior – A Systematic Literature Review, 34 TELEMATICS & INFORMAT-
ICS 1038 (2017). These decisions may not be entirely rational—people may be 
aware that the costs of their online behavior outweigh the benefits and perform 
risky online behaviors anyways. Id. at 1039. 
  
2019] INCOGNITO MODE 541 
 
and desires. Mere participation in communication over the inter-
net should not mean you have forever forfeited privacy in your 
internet history. 
III.  COURTS CAN AND SHOULD EXTEND CARPENTER TO 
PROTECT INTERNET HISTORY   
This Part will argue that lower courts can and should extend 
Carpenter to cover historical records of non-content internet his-
tory, real-time monitoring of the same content, and disclosure of 
basic subscriber information. This Part will first note that Car-
penter is likely broader than its assertedly narrow holding and 
lay out a theory by which courts could extend Carpenter to re-
quire a warrant for certain kinds of internet history. This Part 
will then examine the three scenarios described above and argue 
that courts could reasonably extend Carpenter to apply to these 
scenarios. Finally, this Part will contend that the best way to 
extend Carpenter to cover these scenarios is to impose a warrant 
requirement when the government seeks to collect information 
falling into these categories. 
A. CARPENTER CAN BE BROADER THAN ITS NARROW HOLDING 
In Carpenter, Chief Justice Roberts wrote in no uncertain 
terms about the bounds of the Court’s opinion: “Our decision to-
day is a narrow one. We do not express a view on matters not 
before us.”221 Roberts says that the Court’s opinion does not dis-
turb Smith or Miller and does not “call into question conven-
tional surveillance techniques.”222 As noted above,223 this lan-
guage has left lower courts understandably squeamish when 
faced with the prospect of applying the Carpenter factors to new 
factual situations. This Note freely admits that courts are well 
within their authority to refuse to apply Carpenter beyond its 
explicit holding. 
Yet most everyone writing about Carpenter thinks that 
when the Court says seven days of historical cell-site location 
information,224 it means more than seven days of historical cell-
site location information.”225 Rehashing all of the arguments 
 
 221. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018). 
 222. Id.  
 223. See supra Part II.B. 
 224. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 n.3.  
 225. See, e.g., ORIN S. KERR, THE DIGITAL FOURTH AMENDMENT (forthcom-
ing 2019); Jennifer A. Brobst, The Metal Eye: Ethical Regulation of the State’s 
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here is unnecessary. The volume of scholarship says that the 
Court has reiterated that digital is different, and that this deci-
sion sets out a framework which the Court will use in the future 
to scope Fourth Amendment searches. The Court itself has ad-
monished lower courts that have “mechanical[ly]” adhered to 
precedent when applying the Fourth Amendment to digital con-
texts.226 Because Carpenter has provided a framework for a de-
cision that calls into question the third-party doctrine,227 exten-
sions beyond its explicit holding are justified—the Court has 
signaled a departure from precedent.228 
But even though the extension of Carpenter may be justified, 
it does not necessarily follow that lower courts should be the ac-
tor to accomplish this task. After all, Congress could merely 
amend the relevant statutes229 to require warrant protections for 
obtaining internet history information and provide for an exclu-
sionary remedy. Indeed, there is a powerful argument that Con-
gress is in the best position to balance the competing interests in 
the privacy analysis, especially when it comes to changing tech-
nology.230  
Congress, however, does not appear to be up to the task. 
First, congressional efforts to update the ECPA have historically 
 
Use of Surveillance Technology and Artificial Intelligence to Observe Humans in 
Confinement, 55 CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 24 (2018); Danielle Keats Citron, Comment, 
A Poor Mother’s Right to Privacy: A Review, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1139, 1164 (2018); 
Christine Guest, Comment, DNA and Law Enforcement: How the Use of Open 
Source DNA Databases Violates Privacy Rights, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 1015, 1044 
(2019); Grace Manning, Alexa: Can You Keep A Secret? The Third-Party Doc-
trine in the Age of the Smart Home, 56 AM. CRIM. L. REV. ONLINE 25, 26 (2019); 
Ohm, supra note 138, at 361–66; Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Fourth Amendment Rea-
sonableness After Carpenter, 128 YALE L.J.F. 943, 943–44 (2019); Wouter Zwart, 
Note, Slow Your Roll Out of Body-Worn Cameras: Privacy Concerns and the 
Tension Between Transparency and Surveillance in Arizona, 60 ARIZ. L. REV. 
783, 799 n.112 (2018).  
 226. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 386 (2014). 
 227. See supra Part I.D. 
 228. For a discussion of why lower courts are justified in “narrowing from 
below” outdated precedents, see Richard M. Re, Narrowing Supreme Court Prec-
edent from Below, 104 GEO. L.J. 921 (2016). Though as admitted above, the 
“best” reading of Carpenter is likely its explicit holding on historical CSLI, it is 
still within reason to read the Court’s framework as applying to other categories 
of digital information as it is written so broadly.  
 229. See supra Part I.C.2. 
 230. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: 
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 806 
(2004) (arguing that the legislative branch should create the “primary investi-
gative rules when technology is changing”). 
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stalled, despite strong support from industry and civil liberties 
groups.231 Second, while political will may exist to provide pri-
vacy protections against corporate surveillance of user infor-
mation in the wake of various scandals involving Facebook, the 
same may not be true of efforts to restrict government surveil-
lance.232 Recent changes to privacy legislation have gone in the 
other direction, ratifying, and in some cases, expanding govern-
ment surveillance power.233 Courts, therefore, must step in and 
fulfill their constitutional duty to protect against overreaches by 
the political branches.234  
B. EXTENSION OF CARPENTER: THREE SCENARIOS 
If lower courts accept that Carpenter’s reasoning can apply 
beyond seven days of historical cell-site location information, 
then they need a test to apply to new sets of facts. This Note pro-
poses that if digital data sought meet the factors set out in Car-
penter, then a court should hold that law enforcement conduct to 
obtain data constitutes a search.235 Consistent with Carpenter, 
this finding should not be a case-by-case determination based on 
whether an invasion of privacy actually occurred, but a determi-
nation based on the type of data sought. Further, because Car-
penter reiterates the proposition that inferences do not insulate 
a search,236 a court determining whether a Carpenter search has 
 
 231. Mike Orcutt, Why Congress Can’t Seem To Fix This 30-Year-Old Law 
Governing Your Electronic Data, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 17, 2017) https://www 
.technologyreview.com/s/603636/why-congress-cant-seem-to-fix-this-30-year-
old-law-governing-your-electronic-data/ [https://perma.cc/3JED-FNVW]. 
 232. Louise Matsakis, SCOTUS and Congress Leave the Right to Privacy Up 
For Grabs, WIRED (July 3, 2018, 11:49 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/scotus 
-congress-leave-right-to-privacy-up-for-grabs/ [https://perma.cc/9PV2-LRZV]. 
 233. See Louise Matsakis, Congress Renews Warrantless Surveillance—and 
Makes It Even Worse, WIRED (Jan. 11, 2018, 4:19 PM), https://www.wired.com/ 
story/fisa-section-702-renewal-congress/ [https://perma.cc/5MAH-8LAW]. 
 234. See GRAY, supra note 199, at 14; THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 469 (Alex-
ander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“[T]he courts of justice are to be 
considered as the bulwarks of a limited Constitution against legislative en-
croachments . . . .”). 
 235. There is an alternative theory based on bailment of digital information 
that the Court might also support, which is beyond the scope of this Note. For a 
brief discussion of this theory, see Ohm, supra note 138, at 36. Another alterna-
tive approach to remedying the problems with the third-party doctrine is con-
sidered earlier in this volume. See Wayne A. Logan & Jake Linford, Contracting 
for Fourth Amendment Privacy Online, 104 MINN. L. REV. 101 (2019) (arguing 
that contract law could inform the Fourth Amendment analysis). 
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occurred must look at all of the sensitive information that may 
be compromised by tying a person to a particular collection of 
internet activity. 
Both Professors Ohm and Kerr have argued that imple-
menting Carpenter would likely cover some internet history rec-
ords.237 Neither go far enough with their analysis. This Section 
will argue that while Ohm and Kerr are correct to recognize that 
IP addresses of the websites a user visits should be protected 
under the rationale of Carpenter, similar logic should extend this 
rationale to cover both real-time monitoring of the same infor-
mation and basic subscriber information that can in effect tie a 
person to a set of internet activity. 
The contours of Carpenter remain fuzzy even as to how it 
protects historical cell-site location information. Extension of the 
reasoning thus presents even greater challenges. The following 
three scenarios will attempt to provide some guidance as to what 
extension of Carpenter’s reasoning to collection of internet his-
tory could look like. 
1. Scenario One: A Court Order Requires an ISP or Website 
To Disclose Historical Information About a User 
In In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 2703(d), the government sought information from Twit-
ter about a variety of parties, including Chelsea Manning, Julian 
Assange, and Wikileaks.238 The government obtained an ex parte 
order under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) requesting Twitter disclose the 
subscriber information for accounts “registered to or associated 
with” these parties (among others) as well as “records of user 
activity for any connections made to or from the Account[s].”239 
The Eastern District of Virginia denied a Fourth Amendment 
challenge to the order, holding that the parties lacked a reason-
able expectation of privacy in IP address information.240  
One could imagine similar cases where law enforcement has 
something more than a hunch241 about someone’s suspected 
criminal activity but less than probable cause. Under current 
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law, law enforcement can subpoena large swaths of that user’s 
internet activity from ISPs or websites to prove their case.242  
This situation should fall squarely within the Carpenter fac-
tors.243 First, the data are deeply revealing. As described above, 
a collection of IP addresses that a person accessed essentially 
provides a history of that person’s internet activity.244 This ac-
tivity may reveal sensitive information about a person’s life.245 
Second, the data are deep, broad, and comprehensive. ISPs may 
keep years of records of a user’s connections to other IP ad-
dresses.246  
Third, collection of these data is inescapable and automatic. 
IP addresses are assigned to computers and required to facilitate 
communication between computers.247 Like cell-site location in-
formation, IP addresses operate behind the scenes such that 
turning them over could hardly be considered voluntary. There 
is a colorable argument that a user volunteers IP address infor-
mation when they visit a webpage,248 but this misreads Carpen-
ter.249 The Carpenter Court, noting that cell phones become “in-
dispensable to participation in modern society,” expressed a 
concern that “virtually any activity” on a phone would generate 
CSLI and thus required voluntary disclosure in a “meaningful 
sense.”250 Though the Court noted that automatic data connec-
tions made by the phone bolstered its argument, the Court did 
not so finely parse cell phone activities into voluntary and auto-
matic. Instead, the Court swept all CSLI generated by a cell 
phone into its analysis. Similarly, the internet is a critical part 
of modern society. And, like CSLI, a user creates IP address in-
formation by virtually any activity on the internet.251 It is diffi-
cult to distinguish between the two on this Carpenter factor. 
Fourth, the ability to collect these data is a massive effi-
ciency gain for law enforcement. There is no precise historical 
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analog to the type of information law enforcement have access to 
with internet histories. IP addresses may reveal detailed histo-
ries of a person’s plans and predilections unobtainable by tradi-
tional surveillance tools without a warrant.  
Thus, each Carpenter factor supports treating historical IP 
address information like historical CSLI. Courts should reject 
the myopic view of interpreting Carpenter as only pertaining to 
location information; obtaining IP address information can be as, 
or in many cases more, intrusive than historical CSLI. 
2. Scenario Two: A Pen/Trap Device Captures Real-Time 
Information About a User’s Internet Activities 
This scenario is the one encountered in the introduction to 
this Note. As a part of the investigation of Ulbricht, law enforce-
ment installed five pen/trap devices to track the internet activity 
to and from Ulbricht’s home router.252 The orders authorizing 
the installation of the devices allowed law enforcement to collect 
source and destination IP addresses, with “dates, times, dura-
tions, [and] ports of transmission.”253 
The information obtained is no different than the infor-
mation obtained in scenario one. The difference here is that the 
information obtained with a pen/trap device is obtained in real 
time instead of as a prefigured collection.254 An open question 
remains about whether the Carpenter factors apply to data col-
lection in real time.255 In the case of pen/trap devices to collect 
internet activity, they should; the kind of information collected 
is identical to that sought in Scenario One. 
Even courts placing an emphasis on the durational limit ex-
pressed in Carpenter should find no difficulty here because a 
pen/trap order must specify the length of time the order will 
last.256 Thus, the historical and real-time situations are function-
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ally indistinguishable; a lump sum invasion of privacy is no dif-
ferent than a day-by-day invasion.257 The Carpenter Court ex-
pressed a concern with data collected over a span of seven 
days.258 Most pen/trap cases are likely to exceed this span. The 
statutory scheme for obtaining a pen/trap device allows and an-
ticipates collection of up to four months of information.259 This 
fact would likely obviate the need for a lower court to confront 
whether there is some period under seven days where a search 
does not occur. 
In the rare case where the government seeks to obtain less 
than a week of real-time internet activity and the lower court 
was focused on the seven-day cap in Carpenter, courts may still 
be justified in finding a Fourth Amendment search. The distance 
someone can travel in a day is limited by their access to trans-
portation; the distance someone can travel on the internet is lim-
ited only by how fast they can click. The average adult spends 
5.9 hours a day with digital media, including smartphones, desk-
tops, laptops, streaming devices and gaming devices.260 It is pos-
sible to visit numerous websites in those 5.9 hours, creating a 
detailed picture of the person using the device. Thus, the privacy 
concerns still exist in real-time collection of internet history even 
if it is over a seemingly short amount of time. 
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3. Scenario Three: A Subpoena Allows Law Enforcement To 
Obtain Basic Subscriber Information Associated with an IP 
Address 
A common occurrence in child pornography prosecutions is 
that law enforcement officials will discover through investiga-
tion that a computer has viewed or downloaded illicit materials, 
but law enforcement will only have the IP address associated 
with that computer.261 For example, in United States v. Perez, 
the FBI received a complaint from a woman who claimed a Ya-
hoo! user had sent her images of children engaged in sexual 
acts.262 The FBI subpoenaed Yahoo! for the user’s IP address and 
was able to determine that Time Warner Cable had issued the 
IP address.263 The FBI then subpoenaed Time Warner for the 
user information associated with that IP address, including the 
user’s address.264 This subpoena revealed that Time Warner had 
issued the IP address to Javier Perez.265 Using this information 
combined with a public records check, the FBI obtained and ex-
ecuted a search warrant on Perez’s home and found over 4,000 
compact discs of child pornography.266 
Courts applying Carpenter should hold that both of these re-
quests would be searches. This is admittedly the most tenuous 
extension of Carpenter; there are good arguments that obtaining 
basic subscriber information alone does not reveal the same 
things about a person’s conduct online that obtaining a record of 
their history does.267 But Carpenter and the Court’s technology 
exceptionalism requires that access to data following the search 
plays a role in deciding whether the initial conduct is a search, a 
concept Professor Kerr has termed “downstream analysis.”268 
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This downstream analysis reveals that Professor Kerr’s con-
clusion about subscriber records not being protected should fall. 
Even where the information requested from an ISP or a website 
does not provide a history of a person’s internet activity, law en-
forcement can use this information to tie a person to internet 
activity, either through additional legal process or basic internet 
searches. If a person has used the same username across multi-
ple websites or uses websites that use IP addresses as an identi-
fier,269 a Google search of this person’s IP address or username 
will likely reveal a great history of that person’s activity. Such a 
holding would not require that a court set a limit on the permis-
sible amount of information that the downstream searches could 
reveal,270 but merely to conclude that the total risk is unreason-
able. 
Such a holding and rationale would not be unknown in ju-
risprudence. In R. v. Spencer, a 2014 Supreme Court of Canada 
case, police arrested Matthew David Spencer for possessing child 
pornography.271 In investigating a peer-to-peer file sharing sys-
tem, police obtained an IP address that had downloaded child 
pornography.272 In accordance with Canada’s Personal Infor-
mation Protection and Electronic Documents Act, police re-
quested basic subscriber information from the ISP that had is-
sued the IP address.273 They identified the IP address as 
belonging to Spencer and arrested him.274 The trial court con-
victed Spencer and the Court of Appeal affirmed.275 Spencer ap-
pealed.276 
The Supreme Court of Canada ultimately dismissed Spen-
cer’s appeal, but before they did, they concluded that Spencer 
possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in his subscriber 
information, and thus the police conduct amounted to a 
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search.277 The court performed a downstream analysis of the pri-
vacy risk posed by associating a person’s identity with their 
online activity.278 The court concluded that removing the anony-
mous nature of the internet would significantly harm informa-
tional privacy, linking a person to a set of online activities.279  
Such a holding would also neatly follow from the factors and 
preferences laid out in Carpenter. Though the Carpenter factors 
likely apply better to the information gained in the second order 
compilation of an internet history,280 it is the ability to associate 
the person with the information that renders the conduct a 
search and subject to the traditional Fourth Amendment protec-
tions. 
C. A REASONABLE SEARCH REQUIRES A WARRANT 
If lower courts hold that any of the above three scenarios 
constitute a search, they should additionally hold that, in most 
cases, the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amend-
ment requires that law enforcement obtain a warrant. This con-
clusion derives from Carpenter, in which the Court reiterated a 
preference that a warrant be obtained when law enforcement 
seeks evidence of criminal wrongdoing.281 The warrant require-
ment is a doctrinally-supported and superior way to safeguard 
internet privacy.282 
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Some may argue that the warrant requirement is ultimately 
toothless to protect privacy due to its ultimately flexible stand-
ard and the frequency with which magistrate judges approve 
warrants.283 Even if warrants are granted with relative ease, ex 
ante review is superior to ex post review in the context of the 
warrant because ex post review cannot prevent the privacy in-
jury.284 That is, a warrant requirement allows a neutral magis-
trate to prevent the privacy injury from ever occurring rather 
than having to assess whether the search was reasonable after 
it has already occurred. Moreover, it may be more difficult for a 
judge to conclude probable cause did not exist when incriminat-
ing evidence sits before them. A warrant requirement, even if it 
is ultimately a light burden, imposes decision costs on seeking a 
search, which is likely to crowd out more questionable searches. 
Police would still be able to obtain a warrant in the vast majority 
of cases,285 but fishing expeditions would be further discouraged. 
  CONCLUSION   
The internet, for all its flaws and foibles,286 has become an 
indispensable component of modern life. People use the internet 
to work, play, shop, learn, politically organize, find love and re-
lationships, communicate secret thoughts and desires, and feel 
a little less alone in the world. The anonymity afforded by the 
internet allows communities to flourish and ideas to be freely 
exchanged. The current state of internet protections, combined 
with congressional inertia, threatens to clamp down on this free 
exchange. Carpenter set out a vision for how to apply the Fourth 
Amendment to digital privacy issues. Lower courts can and 
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should begin to fulfill this vision by recognizing that collection of 
internet history constitutes a search. While undoubtedly the in-
ternet has nefarious uses, imposing a warrant requirement on 
collection of a person’s internet history checks the worst uses of 
the internet while not chilling participation. Recognizing a 
Fourth Amendment interest in internet history would help pre-
serve core privacy interests and ultimately demonstrate a com-
mitment to a transformative technology.  
